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Abstract: The Spanish constitution proclaims Spanish unity to be indissoluble and, therefore, does not 
recognize the right to secession. However, this prevision could be reformed, even if it involves rather 
complicated processes. All said, it is good to bear in mind that different internal and international jurisdictions 
have recognized that national communities have a right to decide their political future collectively; including 
secession, understood to be a political aspiration, protected by the democratic principle of freedom of speech, 
and the right to participate can direct the modification of the constitutional order of a state, in a way that is 
legal and agreeable to all involved. However, there are cases of national communities that do not recognise 
that right, or the parent nation shows no desire to negotiate the terms of an improved accommodation of their 
political status, or allow a referendum to be held for this effect. In these cases, the recent practice of some 
States as well as comparative law, show the viability, under certain conditions, of a unilateral declaration of 
independence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE RIGHT TO SECESSION TODAY 
 
It is known that the International Law does not consider secession as a right 
(Musgrave, 1997: 210)
2
. On the contrary, it establishes the principle of territorial integrity 
of the States on the basis that the international community is made up by the States, which, 
                                                          
1
 Tenured Professor, Certified in Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona (jridao@ub.edu). 
2
 According to T. Musgrave, «[s]ecession is a domestic question and, therefore, a completely neutral act in 
terms of International Law. Besides, since it is not considered within the jurisdiction of international laws, not 
just any attempt of secession entails an act of self-determination in juridical terms. Even when consequences 
for International Law are derived, with the emergence of a new State, the act of secession itself has a rather 
political and not juridical nature» (1997: 210).  
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logically, are not only the source but also the direct target of the International Law
3
. 
However, as it is also broadly known, it acknowledges the right to self-determination 
(external or the right to secession), linked, as has been said, to «oppressed and colonized 
communities», although it is not specified either in the Charter of the United Nations from 
1945 (art. 1.2, 55 and 76)
4
, nor in the International Covenants of civil and political Rights 
and economic, social and cultural Rights (New York Agreements from 1966)
5
, or in each of 
the Resolutions of the General Assembly (GAUN) which deal with the issue: 1514 (XV 
Assembly)
6
 and 2625 (XXV Assembly).  
 
The breakup of the Central European empires, the implosion of the old USSR and 
the beginning of the processes of decolonization, especially in the African continent, lead 
International Law to accept the creation of new States, already in the first half of last 
century, with their own identity or national signs. In this way, it legitimized the breakup of 
the territorial integrity of the original States.  However, this right has been progressively 
more closely associated to the rights of colonized or oppressed peoples. So, the secessionist 
claims of communities within liberal-democratic States with Constitutions that respect their 
internal self-determination (cultural rights, language and minimal forms of self-
government, etc.) can hardly be justified in front of this classical right. 
 
This explains why many states have been generally reluctant to accept the secession 
of other States, even if they have sporadically accepted them in front of the eventuality of 
some of the breakup processes such as the one in the USSR or Yugoslavia, or because of 
internal agreements such as the case of the Czech Republic or Slovakia
7
. Besides, it is 
                                                          
3
 For the most unyielding doctrine, even «in its legal dimension it is evident that self-determination does not 
subsume today, and probably will not subsume in the future, a general right of secession for the infra-state 
groups. On the contrary, what can be concluded from the experience of these last years is that the 
International Law is still hostile to secession, even in the colonial context […] unless the very exceptional 
theory of “remedy-secession” can be objectively applicable». (Cristakis, 1999 : 617). For Dieter Murswiek, 
«the states with a longer history typically have greater stability, but this does not mean that they are not also 
the object of secession demands. Many states, especially in the East, fear that the concession of autonomy to 
certain ethnic minorities might be the first step towards secession and the breaking up of the State. However, I 
am convinced of the opposite. Autonomy is the best prevention against the demands of secession». 
(Tomuschat, 1993: 39). 
4
 Art. 1.2 of the Charter from 26 June 1945 establishes that «[t]he Purposes of the United Nations are to 
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches 
of the peace». Articles 55 and 76 are expressed in very similar terms. 
5
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the GAUN, New York, 23 March 1976. Resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.  
6
 Resolution 1514 of the GAUN about the Independence to the countries and colonial communities, New 
York, 14 December 1960. In these lines, see Margiotta, 2005: 89-209. 
7
 Many events are closely related to the disappearance of great empires such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
or the Ottoman Empire, after the Great War, or the Soviet Empire at the end of 1980s. Some States also had 
their origins in unusual national protests against the colonial authorities, such as the English, the French or the 
Portuguese in the case of Indochina or Africa, after the Second World War and until mid 1960s. In the context 
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obvious that one of the most renowned cases, the independence of Kosovo (2008) does not 
make a traditional assumption of self-determination, as it took place outside a context of 
decolonization. 
 
The right to self-determination and the right to decide are not, in fact, equivalent 
terms. They were linked to one another originally, but this does not imply that they are 
conceptually the same thing. On the contrary, as has been seen, the right to self-
determination in its external aspect is exercised by those communities which are 
internationally accepted, with equally acknowledged conflicts.
8
 On the other hand, the right 
to decide, that could imply a territory’s secession, is not acknowledged by public 
international law, or by the internal legal system of most States
9
. However, it is known that 
the Primary Right Theories
10
 understand that secession is an inalienable right in all liberal 
democracy, independent of the treatment of the parent State towards the secessionist sub-
state entity. 
 
Plebiscite and democratic theories, based on the individual right for association, 
specifically confirm this possibility from a democratic principle point of view. This, 
together with the principle of federalism was decisive in the decision of the Canadian 
Supreme Court regarding Quebec
11
, and that, effectively, is leading the traditional 
constitutional repudiation of any attempt of secession to give way to at least a mutual 
obligation for all federated parties or those united by constitutional ties to negotiate the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
of liberal and pluralist democracies, the new States emerged as a result of social and ethnic conflicts. More 
remotely, we could mention the case of Norway (1904) and Ireland (1921) as well as some insular regions: 
Cyprus and the Isle of Malta. Finally, there were bursts of several movements of identity assertion of great 
intensity in plurinational states with a complex structure such as Belgium, Canada, the UK or Spain. In all 
cases, it is a matter of States drawn together as a result of unions of crowns, religious wars or, as in the case of 
Quebec, the great colonizing campaigns of the British.  
8
 As warned by E. Milano, «the practices of the States and the international community in the Post Cold War 
era seem to have remodeled the nature and the effects of such a principle, from which one can mainly derive a 
right of the peoples to become independent from the authority of a foreign, enemy or merely illegitimate 
government, as a way to reassert the requirement of respect to the principle of territorial integrity of the 
States» (2013a: 8). 
9
 No federal Constitution, except for the case of art. 39 of the Constitution of Ethiopia from 1995 or article 60 
of the federal Constitution of Serbia-Montenegro from 2003 acknowledge the right to secession and they 
impose respect to the adopted agreements. See Constitution of Ethiopia (Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995).  
10
 In this regard see Roepstorff, 2013. 
11
 The opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada [Reference by the Governor-General Concerning Certain 
Questions Relating to the Secession of Quebec from Canada (Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998) 2 
SCR 217] came to solve a double question raised by the government Canadian federal: «Behold international 
law the right to unilaterally declare independence of Quebec from Canada by the National Assembly, 
Parliament or the Government of Quebec»; and in the same sense, «[T] here is one right to self-determination 
under international law that grants to the National Assembly, Parliament or the Government of Quebec the 
right to unilaterally declare independence of Quebec from Canada?». 
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needed changes to grant those wishes. This has been reinforced by the fact that referendums 
or other types of popular consultations are common practice in liberal democracies. 
 
It is also good to remember that, on an international scale, the democratic principle 
is incorporated in various relevant instruments, like the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights from 1948, which establishes «The will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government» (art. 21.3)
12
. At a European level, there have also been different 
reformations of founding treaties that reinforce the commitment of respect for human rights 




Even at an internal State level, 
in most cases, once a community’s democratic will to peacefully become a State in its own 
right has been established, this will is given the same importance as the provisions of the 
constitutional order of the parent State, even if it does not allow secession or simply does 
not provide for it, as in the case of Quebec or Scotland, that we will analyse in the 
following pages.  
 
It is undeniable that the Ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court regarding the 
secession of Quebec in August 1998; the Ruling of the International Court of Justice 
regarding Kosovo; the agreements between the British and Scottish governments regarding 
the Scottish referendum; or the Ruling of the Commission of Venice from the Council of 
Europe regarding the Montenegro referendum, represent an emerging  set of guidelines or 
rules that control the exercise of the right to decide everything, although not legislated by 
International Law or the internal law of each state, putting to one side the motives behind 
the secession, seeing as these are understood to be fruit of «the complexity of different 
political realities»
14
, covering the democratic principle, the still well-known doctrine of 
effectiveness, as is seen in the fact that 69 members of the United Nations acknowledged 
Kosovo as an independent State, even if Serbia did not accept its existence and keeps 
claiming its territorial integrity
15
. 
                                                          
12
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 207 A (III) by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Paris, 
the 10th of December 1948 http://www.un.org/es/documents/udhr/ [visited: 25th of October 2014] 
13
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Nice, 7th of December 2000. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf_es.pdf [visited: 25th of October 2014] 
14
 For a general overview of the case of Kosovo, see M. Arcari; L. Balmond: «Questions de droit international 
autour de l’avis consultative de la Cour Internationale de Justice – International law issues arising from the 
International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Kosovo», L. Balmond; M. Arcari; E. Milano; M. Pertile; J. 
Martin; P. Palchetti; W. Czaplinski; M. Vitucci; and A. Tancredi: Declarations of independence and 
territorial integrity in general international law: some reflections in light of the Court’s advisory opinion, 
Giuffré, 2011, pp. 59-90; D. Thürer andT. Burri, «Self-Determination», Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2013; and E. Milano, 
Formazione dello Stato e processi di State-building nel diritto internazionale. Kosovo 1999-2013, Napoli, 
Editoriale Scientifica, 2013b. 
15
 In fact, even though we will discuss the case of Kosovo further on, we will state now that when this old 
Serbian province made a unilateral declaration of independence, the EU immediately adopted a joint 
resolution in which it qualified it as a ”unique case”, leaving it up to each State whether they accepted it or 
not. Most states, with Germany, France and the United Kingdom at the forefront, did so. This wide 
international support was decisive as that same year, the General Assembly of the United Nations, agreed, as 
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Therefore for the infra-state groups that aim at their independence or at a given 
political status, the question is either in the need to reach, and democratically express a 
wide majority for the separation (or the intended status) by means of the instruments of a 
negotiation which allows the corresponding reforms in the internal constitutional order, or 
else, in some extreme cases, a unilateral but legal decision, provided it gathers the support 
of a critical mass of States in the international community which is enough to make the 
declaration viable.  
 
 
II. THE SITUATION IN SPAIN AND THE CASE OF CATALONIA 
 
II.1. Spanish constitutional order in the light of the recent Judgment 42/2014 of the 
Spanish Constitutional Court 
 
As has been stated, the Spanish Constitution (SC) claims the indissoluble unity of 
the Spanish nation and, consequently, it does not acknowledge the right to secession. The 
Sentence 42/2014 from the Spanish Constitutional Court (CC)
16
, regarding the «Resolution 
5/X from the Parliament of Catalonia, whereby the Declaration of sovereignty and the right 
to decide of the Catalan people is passed» declared that the acknowledgement that such a 
declaration made of the Catalan people as a «legal and political sovereign subject» is 
contrary to articles 1.2 and 2 SC and articles 1 and 2.4 of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, 
and connected to these, contrary to articles 9.1 and 168 SC as well.  
 
In fact, on 21 January 2013 the Catalan Parliament passed the Resolution 5/X
17
, 
previously known as «Sovereignty Declaration», which invoked the «Democratic 
Principle»
18
 and abandoned the classical invocation of sovereignty of the right to self-
determination (Resolutions 1514-XV from 1960 and 2625-XXV from 1970  of the United 
Nations), since they considered that this new right was only applicable in the case of the 
making up of an independent State ex novo, or in the case of secession of colonially-
subjugated communities, military-occupied nations or those communities which belong to a 
repressive State which violates human rights (art. 1.2 of the 1945 Charter and art. 1.1 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
proposed by Serbia, to transfer the matter to the International Court of Justice, if the declaration violated 
international law. Presently the European Commission itself is directly negotiating with the Kosovar 
authorities regarding their future entry into the EU, after the European Council decided in June 2013, to open 
negotiations to establish an Agreement for Stabilization and Association. 
16
 STC 42/2014, 25th March 2014 BOE (Spanish Official Bulletin) number. 87, 10th of April 2014, pp. 77-99. 
17
 See for further information, Vintró, J., 2013. 
18
 «[T]he Catalan nation has, for reasons of democratic legitimacy, the nature of political and legal sovereign 
subject” [and (The) process of the exercise of the right to decide will be strictly democratic and will especially 
guarantee plurality and respect to all options by deliberation and dialogue within the Catalan society, so that 
the pronouncement which will emerge as a result will be the majority expression of the popular will, which 
will be the essential guarantee of the right to decide». 
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International Agreements on Civil and Political Rights, or New York Agreements, from 
1966).  
 
What is relevant is that, even though the «Sovereignty Declaration» of the Catalan 
Parliament has been declared to be unconstitutional, sentence 42/2014 issued by the 
Spanish Constitutional Court warned that there is no normative nucleus which is 
inaccessible to the procedures of a reform of the Spanish Constitution. Besides, it 
acknowledges the right to decide as a political aspiration protected by the freedom of 
expression and by the right to participation in political issues established in the Magna 
Carta. For the Spanish High Court, this right to decide is not the right to self-determination 
and it has its own nominalization: it is not a conferring of sovereignty but the right of the 
citizens of Catalonia to decide on their political future. For this, as preparation measures, it 
would be even possible to call a consultation or a referendum before the opening of a 
process of constitutional reform which could not lead to a reconsideration of the identity or 
the unity of the sovereign subject from the start or, even less, a reconsideration of the 
relationship which only the sovereign subject can establish between the State and the 
Autonomous Communities (nationalities or regions of Spain). 
 
From this point, on the basis of the democratic principle of article 1 SC, and with a 
lack of limits to the constitutional reform, several directions can be found in the Spanish 
legal system by means of which, apart from the constitutional revision via article 168 SC
19
, 
a declaration may be allowed with a consultative nature regarding the beginning of this 
process, and especially the consultative referendums of article 92 SC
20
, which have a state 
scope, but which could be applied to the autonomous communities; the delegation of the 
state competencies to allow referendums of article 149.1.32 SC, in line with the events in 
Scotland with the Order of Council
21
 which allowed a Scottish referendum on 18 
September 2014 by the Edinburgh authorities; and the referendums and the non referendary 
consultations of an autonomous or regional scope. Doubtlessly, these examples represent an 
appeal to the possibility that the members of a political community could define their own 
legal and political framework on the basis of clear and freely formed majorities, in 
accordance with the doctrine emanated from the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of 
Quebec. 
                                                          
19
 «1. When a total revision of the Constitution is proposed, or a partial revision thereof, affecting the 
Preliminary Title, Chapter II, Section 1 of Title I, or Title II, the principle shall be approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the members of each Chamber, and the Parliament shall immediately be dissolved. 2. The 
Chambers elected must ratify the decision and proceed to examine the new Constitutional text, which must be 
approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of both Chambers. 3. Once the amendment has been passed 
by the Parliament, it shall be submitted to ratification by referendum». 
20
 «1. Political decisions of special importance may be submitted for a consultative referendum of all the 
citizens. 2. The referendum shall be convoked by the King at the proposal of the President of the Government 
after previous authorization by the House of Representatives. 3. An organic law shall regulate the conditions 
and the procedure of the different kinds of referendums provided for in this Constitution». 
21
 See www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/242/pdfs/uksi_20130242_en.pdf [visited: 15th of November 2014] 
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So, while the Sentence asserts that «in the constitutional framework, an autonomous 
community cannot unilaterally call a referendum of self-determination to decide on their 
integration in Spain», it also explicitly states the possibility of a «constitutional 
interpretation» of the so-called right to decide, understood as «a political aspiration which 
is reached by means of a process which comes to terms with the constitutional legality», 
respectful to the principles of «democratic legitimacy», «pluralism» and «legality», and 
explicitly put forward in the Declaration of sovereignty of the Catalan Parliament, closely 
connected to the right to decide.  
 
This is, without a doubt, the most innovating and important aspect of the Sentence, 
since the Court acknowledges the right to decide as a right which can protect the execution 
of activities focused on «preparing» and «defending» the separation of Catalonia, and to 
urge the «effective consecution» of this objective in the framework of the process of the 
reform of the Constitution. Regarding this point, the Sentence takes the premise, which is 
already stated in many other resolutions, that the Spanish constitutional legislation does not 
meet a model of «activist democracy» and that, consequently, there is room for any kind of 
conception «which aims at modifying the foundations of the constitutional order» such as 
«the will to change the legal status» of an Autonomous Community. Therefore, according 
to the Court, the right to decide is not a right to self-determination, since it has its own 
character. It represents a legitimate political aspiration protected by the freedom of 
expression and, in broader terms, by the right to participate in political issues. It is worth 
noting that, furthermore, the Sentence does not restrict or limit the right to decide just to the 
possibility to motivate a process of constitutional reform but, for the first time, it explicitly 
states that the public powers of an Autonomous Community can legitimately carry out 




II.2. Alternatives in case it is blocked  
 
Notwithstanding what has already been stated, the Spanish government keeps an 
unyielding attitude in front of all these possibilities and it puts forward that the subject 
matter of the Catalan consultation clashes with the fact that the Constitution claims the 
unity of the Spanish nation, and that the only sovereign subject is the whole of the Spanish 
people (art. 1.2 and 2 SC). 
 
This means that, in Catalonia, the scenario of the future relationship with the 
Spanish State has changed in a very short period of time. And even more so if you also take 
into account that, before the Catalan institutions openly contemplated holding a 
consultation, there was an attempt to agree a new Statute of Autonomy, passed by the 
Catalan Parliament in 2005 with a wide political and citizen support, aimed at 
institutionalizing a status of bilateralism between Catalonia and the State. However, it was 
frustrated during its development, first by the Spanish Parliament and later, and with final 
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consequences, with Sentence 31/2010 of the Constitutional Court
22
, from the 28
th
 of June, 
that had already been operationally deactivated by a declaration of unconstitutionality or 
the reinterpretation of a large part of its precepts, regarding key aspects such as financing, 
competencies or considering Catalonia as a nation. 
 
This Sentence led most of the Catalan society to draw two conclusions: the evidence 
of the successful actions to politically deactivate the Statute by the powers of the State and, 
at the same time, a great disappointment –politically speaking- towards the Spanish State in 
terms of coming to a joint agreement. This second conclusion, of great importance, forced a 
change in the positions of traditional political catalanism which, from mid-nineteenth 
century, had accepted an autonomous fitting of Catalonia within Spain which respected its 
national, linguistic and cultural singularity
23
 to a bet by the citizens, which until then was 
minority-but growing-, to become a singular State.  
 
Precisely, the governability agreement subscribed by Convergència i Unió (CiU) 
(the party of President Artur Mas) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) (the 
center-left party, historically for independence) after the last autonomic election, on 
December 19, 2012 «Agreement for the national transition and to guarantee the 
Parliamentary stability of the Catalan Government» explicitly added the commitment of the 
two parties to support every kind of executive an parliamentary actions with the aim of 
calling for a consultation to the Catalan citizens (finally the 9
th
 of November 2014) with a 
clear double question: «Do you want Catalonia to be a state?», and if so, «Do you want this 
state to be independent?». It is, without a doubt a broad political agreement as, apart from 
the two parties mentioned above, it also included Iniciativa per Catalunya-Esquerra Unida i 
Alternativa (ICV. EUiA) and the Candidatures d’Unitat Popular (CUP), covering 
Catalonia’s whole political spectrum, from Christian democrats to the alternative left.          
 
The consultation to be held on November 9, 2014, accepted by the majority of the 
Catalan Parliamentary forces and with a wide support of the public opinion
24
, would be 
regulated by a Catalan law on consultations
25
, which will be presumably passed by the 
                                                          
22
 BOE num. 172, from the 16th of July 2010 pp. 1- 491 
23
 Shortly after this sentence, a massive demonstration took place, which went beyond the citizens’ claim 
against the decision of the Constitutional Court, since its motto was «We are a Nation, We want to decide». 
Two years later, after the massive demonstration on September 11, 2012 (National Day of Catalonia) for the 
independence of Catalonia, and after the results of the Autonomic elections held on November 25, 2012, 
which granted a majority of pro-sovereignty and for the right to decide at the Parliament, there were different 
resolutions of the Catalan Chamber for the «right to decide» and for the celebration of a popular consultation 
within the legal framework regarding the political future of Catalonia and its relationship with Spain (742/IX, 
5/X i 323/X). 
24
 Information about the survey published by the Center of Opinion Studies of the Generalitat de Catalunya on 
March 18, 2014 ˂http://www.ara.cat/politica/sondeig-CEO-independencia_0_1103889719.html˃ [visited on 
March 19, 2014] 
25
 DOGC (Official Newspaper of the Generalitat de Catalunya) number 6715, 27th of September 2014, pp. 1-
19.  
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Catalan Parliament after the summer. Law 10/2014 from the 26th of September, on popular 
non-referendum consultations and other forms of citizen participation, anticipated the 
organization by the Generalitat de Catalunya of popular consultations for political 
questions of special importance. But, as the Spanish Government has repeatedly 
announced, both this law and the Decree to call the consultation itself, which will be signed 
by the President of the Generalitat of Catalunya, would be appealed in front of the Court, 
with the intention to declare them unconstitutional after having stopped them. The 
predetermination which would claim that the Spanish Constitution democratically 
consecrates the united nature of the Spanish Nation, as well as the united sovereignty of the 
Spanish people regarding a process based on popular will, would be a positioning which 
would deny the chance to know the real will of a nation, in this case the Catalan nation, to 
initiate a political process from a popular consultation, a democratic process that has been 
indeed considered in Canada or the United Kingdom, with the referendum on the 
independence of Scotland formally called on September 18, 2014.   
 
On the 30th of September, the Constitutional Court accepted an appeal of 
unconstitutionality presented by the Spanish government against the law and the decree for 
a summons to the consultation on the 9
th
 of November. Which is why the summons was 
automatically suspended, as a precaution, in agreement with article 161, 2 SC. In spite of 
this, both the Catalan Government and the parties that were supporting the consultation 
held preparatory meetings, and even selected in Parliament the members who would make 
up the controlling Commission that should exercise electoral authority over the process, 
according to the previsions under the suspended law. As a token of support for the Catalan 
institutional world for the consultation, on the 3rd of October some 800 mayors delivered to 
the headquarters of the Catalan Government the agreements from their municipal plenary 
sessions supporting the summons to the consultation. 
 
With the argument that, in the end, the consultation would not be held, even though 
no secondary legal measures had been made for the provisional suspension by the 
Constitutional Court, the president of the Generalitat de Catalunya, decided on the 14th of 
October to cancel it and substitute it with a so-called  «participative process», that would 
take place under the protection of the statutory powers of the Generalitat, keeping the same 
date and the double question of the consultation that had been dismissed. Specifically, this 
act was based, to start with, on article 122 of the Statute of Autonomy, even though the 
legality had to be judged according to the doctrine of the CC, regarding autonomic and 
local referendums, upon which it has had the chance to pass sentence in various occasions, 
and was collected in the successive appeals of unconstitutionality made by the Catalan 
Government. Therefore, the «process» is protected, according to the Catalan government, 
by the provisions of title III of the same Catalan law 10/2014. These precepts that regulate 
surveys, public audiences, participative forums, and other processes with citizen 
participation, are currently in force, they have not been impugned by the Govern nor has 
the State Council reported in favour of doing so (sentence 964/2014 from the 28th of 
September). The CC has not made even a provisional ruling regarding said «processes». 
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Once again, the Spanish Government impugned the «actions of the Generalitat» 
related to the participative process and both the impugnation and the previous sentence of 
the State Council 1092/2014 from the 30th of October 2014, were based on the fact that 
these actions were legal formal acts, liable to impugnation under title V of the CC’s organic 
law, understating that it was actually a «masked and covered» consultation. Unlike the 
appeal against law 4/2010, the decision was not immediate; it took two weeks, during 
which the Spanish government initially chose to congratulate itself for cancelling the 
consultation, and then went on to discredit the new summons and directly oppose it, 
presenting it as a mere re-edition of the cancelled summons. Subsequently, the 
Constitutional Court also provisionally suspended this «process».  
 
However, both the Catalan government and the group of political and citizen forces 
in favour of the consultation on the 9th of November, carried on with the preparations, 
having understood, that the CC had once again suspended a consultation, but had said 
nothing regarding the «participative process.» Supported by the Generalitat, the process 
went ahead with the collaboration of 40.930 volunteers. The voting took place in 1.317 
participation points all over Catalonia, using many local venues as well as those belonging 
to the Generalitat. The day went ahead with no remarkable incident and with the 
participation of 2.305.290 people, as well as the 14.000 Catalan citizens living abroad that 
placed their ballots in one of the 19 participation points set up in the international 
headquarters of the Generalitat
26
. In light of this, the State’s General Attorney, after 
listening to the Board of Prosecutors and with the opposition of the Attorney for the 
Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia, presented a lawsuit against the president of the 
Generalitat, Artur Mas, the vice president of the Catalan Government, Joana Ortega and the 
Catalan Minister of Education, Irene Rigau, who were accused of various crimes such as 




III. THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 
NON-HOLDING OF A REFERENDUM IN CATALONIA 
 
Sometimes, regulations go beyond the legislator’s initial intentions. This would be 
the case of the provisions of International Law in connection to the self-determination of 
the nations, which have occasionally found themselves in contexts which are very different 
from the decolonization phenomena to which they are associated. As we have already 
analyzed, Kosovo’s UDI, on 7 February 2008, is perhaps the most recent and clearest 
example of a presumably ultra-active normative if we consider what the ruling of the 
                                                          
26
 Despite all the determining factors, the level of participation was similar, if slightly lower, to that of the 
2014 European Parliamentary elections. If nothing else, the vote recount offered a vision of the strong 
mobilization of the independent vote, with 80.76% of the answers in favour of an independent Catalan State. 
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International Court of Justice, from 22 July 2010
27
, states (see sect. 3). In fact, in this 
Advisory Opinion, the ICJ concluded that the UDI proclaimed by the Kosovan Assembly 
was neither opposed to general International Law nor to Resolution 1244 (1999) of the 
Security Council. For this reason, this is a precedent of unquestionable importance, despite 
the critical attitude of the ius-internationalist doctrine and that of some States towards the 
position of the ICJ.  
 
This can be explained because, as we have also seen, the position of the ICJ, which 
would declare the independence of Kosovo as non-opposed to International Law, dismisses 
the most orthodox thesis regarding the principle of self-determination (See section 1) which 
distinguishes between the assumptions of external and internal self-determination. Thus, it 
keeps the cases of external self-determination for classical colonial situations or for sudden 
similar situations, and relates internal self-determination to the cases in which the citizens 
of a nation exercise their right by means of their pronouncement in elections and internal 
consultations. If we consider this thesis, the modality of external self-determination could 
not be based on the same grounds as those cases of colonial situations inside a formal 
democracy.  
 
A totally different case is the UDI proclaimed by the institutions of Crimea, because 
of its later annexation to Russia. The secession of this peninsula on the shore of the Black 
Sea started on February 27, 2014, when Russian soldiers, who initially tried to hide their 
nationality, occupied the airports and buildings of the capital city, Simferopol, with the 
support of the pro-Russian militia. In this situation, a few days later, on March 16, a 
referendum took place which did not meet the minimum acceptable requirements for 
electoral processes in Europe, since its aim was to legitimate a decision taken by the 
Russian authorities and exercised under conditions of forced subjugation. The «yes» 
obtained 96.77% of the votes. After the proclamation of the results, on March 17, the 
authorities of Crimea gave Moscow the formal petition to integrate their territory in the 
Russian Federation and the Duma voted the annexation project on March 21. In spite of the 
undeniable historical, cultural and geostrategic bonds that this territory had with Russia 
(with nearly 57% of Russian speakers), the International Community did not accept the 
results of the referendum, as they violated the Constitution of Ukraine and Crimea, as well 
as International Law. Despite the differences, the Russian Authorities argued that the case 
was presumably analogous to the case of Kosovo, and that the International Community 
had reacted in an inequitable way in this case. Nonetheless, the subsequent conflicts in the 
eastern area of Ukraine have led to new international summits which, within diplomatic 
tensions, have translated into a tacit recognition of the annexation of Crimea to Russia
28
. 
                                                          
27
 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in accordance with the UDI regarding Kosovo from 
July 26, 2010. Available at: a: http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=A/64/881 [visited on February 3, 
2014]. 
28
 BBC program on the summit between Ukraine, Russia and the USA in Geneva on the East Ukraine 
conflict. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27072351 
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Thus, if we observe any of the current member states of the EU, it is impossible to 
appreciate any situation of subjugation, exploitation or violation of the fundamental human 
rights regarding the sub-state entities that conform them or their citizens. This has a special 
significance because it means that, with higher or lower intensity, all the states in the EU 
guarantee the rights and freedom of their citizens with their internal laws, the EU law and 
International Law. As we know, in general International Law, it is also impossible to find 
any kind of explicit prevision that normatively allows the passing of a UDI.  
 
Which one is then the basis of secession or independence of those nations that are 
not entitled to the right of external self-determination? Under which circumstances would 
International Law allow a UDI to be passed?  
 
III.1. International Law in the case of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Kosovo   
 
The International Court of Justice, in the above-mentioned Advisory Opinion of  22
 
July 2010 (under the title «Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence In Respect of Kosovo» sections 79, 81 and 84) set a doctrine of general 
interest: No UDI, whether proclaimed by the Parliament or in a popular way, can count on 
the protection of International Law, but it is not opposed to it  [in the same way, Resolution 
1244 (1999) of the Security Council, was not opposed to any applicable regulation of 
International Law]. Moreover, the ICJ states that in order for any UDI to be legitimate, it 
must be followed (or preceded, for that matter) by a ‘de facto situation’, in which the 
effective presence of the proper elements of a State and, in particular, the exercise of the 
sovereignty through concluding acts, can be proved. 
 
Consequently, the global High Court states that a UDI which is proclaimed in 
territories in which the self-determination principle (external) is not applicable is not 
opposed to the basis of the principle of state territoriality.
29
 These UDIs, added the Court, 
are not forbidden if they do not entail any serious fault to general International Law, 
especially to those issues of imperative nature (ius cogens), such as an illegal use of force 
(par.84). In other words, a UDI cannot be considered opposed to International law if it is 
the result of a democratic pronouncement (par.79), carried out in a peaceful context, 
without the use of force or violence. In this sense, The Hague Court specified that, in those 
cases where a UDI had been declared in breach of international law (e.g. South Rhodesia, 
North Cyprus or the Srpska Republic), the precise contravention of the international law 
order had dealt with the illegal use of force (par. 81)
30
. The guarantee of the territorial 
                                                          
29
 In particular, the ICJ states that, in the case of declarations of Independence outside the exercise of the right 
to self-determination, the practice of the States “does not point to the emergence of a new rule in international 
law which prohibits the making of a declaration of independence in such cases” (section. 79). 
30
 This clarification was done because several members of the procedure alleged that the principle of 
territorial integrity had recently been applied in several secessionist conflicts such as the ones in Georgia and 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, the Security Council had passed 
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integrity of the State is a guarantee that corresponds to the States, which cannot violate it. 
But the prohibition of the use of force, or the threat alone of using it, constitutes an 





Therefore, it can be seen that the Court disregarded the internal constitutional order 
of Serbia in that particular case. It is not in vain that art. 8 of the Serbian Charter explicitly 
banned that possibility: «The Serbian territory is inseparable and indivisible». However, the 
internal constitution had already been partially replaced by an interim regime of self-
government set by the United Nations according to resolution 1244 of the Security Council 
(1999)
32
. For this reason, the ICJ assumed that the authors of the UDI (the stunning 
majority of the members of the Kosovan Parliament and its president) had not violated the 
Serbian constitutional frame given the fact that, when they formally declared their 
independence, they were not acting as bodies of entities of provisional self-government, but 
as a real constitutive powers, according to the capacity conferred by their condition of 
legitimate representatives of the Kosovo nation. After all, the procedure adopted by the 
Kosovan representatives resulted fully democratically legitimated as it had been their own 
«decision», making the democratic principle prevail over the principle of constitutionality.  
 
 
III.2. The European Union when facing a Unilateral Declaration of Independence: a 
legal and political interpretation of the Treaties 
 
At this point, we must briefly revise the position stated by the EU regarding both 
primary and derived Law on the secession and independence of territories of its member 
States. In fact, as it has been explicitly stated, the only precept which has any connection to 
this question is article 4.2 TEU, which states that the EU should respect the essential 
functions of its member States, amongst which is the one to guarantee their territorial 
integrity. But essentially, this precept proclaims the non-interference of the European 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
several resolutions condemning some given declarations of independence: South Rhodesia [216 (1965) and 
217 (1965)] Septentrional Cyprus [541 (1983)] and the Srpska Republic [787 (1992)]. Indeed, the UN does 
not normally intervene in the authorization of the secession of groups that are not homogeneous nation-
communities strictly speaking (e.g, the secession of the Bosnian-Serbians and the Croats from Bosnia).   
31
 In several international agreements, prescriptions addressed to sub-state entities regarding the respect of 
territorial integrity [art.5 of the Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (CPNM); and art. 46 of 
the International Declaration of the rights of indigenous people] constitute a prohibition to sub-state entities to 
declare their independence. Respect for territorial integrity must not be understood separately from the object 
of these rules, addressed to subjects to which this regulation does not acknowledge legal personality (speakers 
of minority languages, national minorities or indigenous people). 
32
 When the UDI was proclaimed, the legal framework of Kosovo was regulated by the Resolution of the 
Security Council of the UN 1244 (1999) which basically contemplated the authorization of the creation of 
international military presence (KFOR) to guarantee peace and demilitarization, as well as civil international 
presence (Interim Administration Mission called UNMIK). This is what established the frame for the 
administration of Kosovo, by using a provisional system of self-government and autonomy.  
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Union in a range of affairs. Nothing is said about the secession or independence of 
territories of a State, or about the consequences that this secession could have for the 
residual State or for the new States which emerged from the separation, or about the 
consequences of a phenomenon of this nature for the Union itself. We must conclude, 
therefore, that if the consequences of these facts are not contemplated in Treaties, the 
criteria used in order to establish whether dissident territories from a member State should 
remain outside the EU have been simply criteria of authority. What is more, after having 
seen some precedents, what happened at one point with the fusion of the two Germanys is 
an indicator of the solutions that the European Union can assume beyond what is 
contemplated in Treaties. Recent mutations of the European Union Law are a good example 





Apart from this, it is needless to say that, in the case of isolated secessions, it would 
not only be necessary to consider how the new State would be, but also the consequent 
situation for the parent state. If we conclude that the secessions of territories of a member 
state are indeed a rupture from the original state, which results in the creation of two new 
states (or several ones), the States resulting from this process could be considered heirs of 
the original State. This would necessarily imply that the two States should ask for their 
attachment to the EU, as well as to the hundreds of international organizations to which 
they previously belonged. All of this without forgetting the fact that it seems plausible that 
the two States could reach a previous agreement, with the unanimous acceptance of its 
terms by the rest of the States, especially in the case of the EU, which would consist in 
asking for the continuity of both political units in the international organizations of which 
they were part originally, although they would have to adjust the conditions of their 
membership and participation to their new reality. This procedure seems complex, but it is 
not impossible. 
 
This way, after the secession of a territory of a member state, the Predecessor State 
would still be the owner of the rights acquired by the original State in the international 
community, that is, within the European Union and the International Organizations. 
According to the mainstream position of the doctrine and the international praxis, the State 
resulting from the secession would be, to all effects, a new State that should ask for its 
incorporation or continuity in the European Union and the rest of international 
organizations, unless we were talking about a State that chooses to remain absolutely 
isolated. 
 
Nonetheless, the problems that emerge for the parent State in this case do not have 
an easy solution. Apart from the hardly comparable precedents of Greenland and Algeria, 
which will be later examined, in the Spanish case, for example, there would be a 
remarkable decrease of its population, of its internal gross product and its territory. If we 
                                                          
33
 See Enrique Linde, 2013: 29. 
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were, for example, in front of a supposed secession of Catalonia, we would be talking about 
the decrease of 16.5% of the Spanish population (7.5 million inhabitants), 18.5% of IGP 
(around 200,000 million Euros) and 6.3% of its territory (around 32,000 square kilometers), 
with a tax contribution far beyond its percentage of population, since Catalonia represents 
24% of the total tax income in Spain
34
. In terms of the EU, it would be beyond complicated 
for Spain to keep the same number of representatives in the European Parliament, votes in 
the Council, or the same contribution to communal expenses or to the European Central 
Bank. Actually, and this is what is relevant, this casuistry is not contemplated and it would 
result in an essential reform of the Union Treaties and the derived law, in order to make the 
necessary adjustments or to adopt political agreements, this time unanimously, to reproduce 
familiar patterns, such as the one regarding the above-mentioned German reunification, or 
even the cases of Greenland-Denmark or France-Algeria. In this sense, it is necessary to 
highlight that the Lisbon Treaty, with effects on 1 December 2009, contemplates the 
voluntary withdrawal of a member state from the Union for the first time. But previous to 




However, in that case, the non-contemplation of a legal procedure of withdrawal in 
the Treaties was not considered important enough to avoid that a State could decide on its 
continuity in the European Union. That was the case of Greenland, which left in 1985 due 
to a dispute regarding fishing rights. As a Denmark territory, this island joined the 
Economic European Union (EEU) in 1973, although a referendum showed they were 
against it. Consequently, in a referendum held in 1982, the option to abandon the EU won, 
with a slight difference of 52% of the votes
36
. Nevertheless, it is still regulated by the EU 
Treaties through the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories.  
 
On the other hand, when Algeria stopped being a French colony in 1962, it also 
abandoned the EU. Precisely, as an answer to a question asked in 2004 by the Welsh 
socialist representative Eluned Morgan to the College of European Commissioners 
regarding the usefulness of the Algerian precedent in the event of independence of a 
European region, Romano Prodi, president of the College of Commissioners at that time, 
answered: «A new independent region, because of its independence, would become a third 
state in connection to the European Union and, from the day of its independence, [Treaties] 
wouldn’t be of application in its territory»
37
. What is relevant, nevertheless, is that the 
                                                          
34




 See article 50 ETU.  
36
 There have been speculations about the rejoining of Greenland to the European Union, as seen from the 
statements by the Greenland Prime Minister reported on the Danish Newspaper Jyllands-Posten on January 4, 
2007.  
37
 Prodi added: «[According to] article 49 of the European Union Treaty, any European State which respects 
the principles referred to in article 6 of the EU Treaty could apply for membership to the Union.»  
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independence of Algeria and its withdrawal from the EEU in 1962 did not have 
consequences for France, one of the six  founding States.   
 
Therefore, we can conclude that, in the event of the rupture of a member state 
resulting in two states (either if one has split from another or because of the emergence of 
two new states from an original one), the reform of the EU Treaties is not essential to 
accommodate them to a new reality if there exists a political agreement, as shown by the 
Algerian precedent. Regarding the case of Greenland, it must be highlighted that in the 
adaptation of the EU Treaties, from 13 March 1984, where the withdrawal is articulated, 
there is no modification of the parent State, Denmark. Besides, Greenland currently keeps 
an Overseas Territory status associated to the EU. Indeed, from an institutional point of 
view, there were no changes either in the number of commissioners (two for France, one 
for Denmark, with or without those territories) or in the assignation of seats in the European 
Parliament (or Parliamentary Assembly, until 1979), which was not affected until the 
German reunification took place, when the parity of seats held by the five great States of 
the Community/European Union was broken.  
 
As additional considerations, and regarding the current situation (with the current 
TEU and the EUFT, modified in Lisbon), the European Parliament cannot exceed 750 
members and the president, and this is nowadays fixed, even if there were other 
incorporations (nevertheless, due to the recent incorporation of Croatia, this has needed to 
be temporarily adjusted, but with no effects on the European Election of May 2014).. Last, 
with the present system of each state’s own resources (Customs rights, 0.3% tax of the 
harmonized VAT basis and resources based on a uniform percentage of the gross national 
income) there is not a direct dependence on fees or contributions by the States depending 
on their size in terms of territory or population.  
     
Apart from the legal speculations, a different scenario would take place when a 
unanimous position, or even a majority one among the Union States, was not reached to 
achieve this political agreement or to reform the Treaties, in particular if most of the States 
were unwilling to confirm the pulling effect that this process could have within their 
respective states. In any case, all these precedents show that the Union has always solved 
these issues politically, regardless of the strict content of the Treaties. In addition, it must 
be taken into account that, as it has already been explained, article 49 TEU contemplates 
that any European State which respects the values mentioned in article 2 of the same Treaty 
and commits itself to promote them, could apply for membership to the Union.  
 
 
IV. CASUISTRY OF THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE   
 
Next, we will study ten recent cases in which a UDI has been part of the successful 
process of secession or independence of a territory within the European continent. We will 
leave out, for now, the processes that have not yet received rulings (Abkhazia, South 
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Ossetia, or Transnistria), or those that have taken place within the African continent 
(Eritrea or South Sudan). 
 
 
IV.1. The case of the Baltic Republics and Ukraine 
 
In August 1989 around two million of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians formed a 
human chain of more than 560 kilometers, from Tallinn to Vilnius, to ask for the 
independence of the Baltic States. Next, the independence of Lithuania was unilaterally 
declared by its Parliament, on 11 March 1990, after the pro-independence leader Vytautas 
Landsbergis, was elected president in the elections held in February 1990 (still as part of 
the USSR) in which the Communist Party was defeated by the Reformation Movement of 
Lithuania, Sajudis, who obtained 101 out of the 141 seats. After a failed soviet intervention 
(on 10 January 1991) a referendum was held, on 9 February 1991, in which the support to 
independence reached 90%, with a turnout of 84.43% of the census. The question, asked in 
Lithuanian, Russian and Polish was: «Do you want Lithuania to be a new independent 
republic?». Later, in August 1991, this new republic was recognized at an international 
level and, on 17 September of the same year it entered the United Nations. Once the 
constituent process had begun, the Constitution was passed more than a year and a half 
after the UDI proclamation (on 25 October 1992 to be precise) and it became effective on 
11 November 1992.  
 
In Estonia, it was initially a convention of representatives who proclaimed a 
unilateral declaration of independence in February 1990, on the basis of the Tractu Treaty 
which was signed on 2 February 1920 with the Bolshevik Russia. According to this Treaty, 
the Republic of Estonia obtained international recognition and became a member of the 
League of Nations on 1921. Later, on the election of 8 May 1990, the PFE (Popular Front 
of Estonia) and other pro-sovereignty groups conquered the Parliament, and the nationalist 
leader, Edgar Savisaar, was elected president of the first government which had emerged 
from an election since 1940. Nonetheless, it was not until August 1990 that the Parliament 
formally proclaimed their independence, although Moscow did not consider it valid.  
 
This UDI was later ratified in a referendum on 3 March 1991. The turnout was 83% 
and the question was «Do you want the restoration of sovereignty and the independence of 
the State of the Republic of Estonia?». The supporters of the «yes» obtained 78.6% of the 
votes, equivalent to 64.6% of the inhabitants with the right to vote, although no quorum of 
participation or minimum percentage to validate the «yes» had been previously defined. On 
20 June 1992, a referendum ratified the Fundamental Law or Constitution (based on the one 
from 1983) and a new Parliament was elected (Riigikogu). On 5 October, Lennart Meri, 
from the National Coalition Party Pro-Patria (NCPP) was elected president. Two days later, 
the new Constitution became effective. The Constitution was passed on 28 June 1992, a 
year and a half after the referendum, and it became effective on 3 July of the same year.  
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In Latvia, on the election of March 1990, the Popular Front obtained 131 seats in 
the Supreme Soviet (8 together with 55 of the PCUS and 15 independents) which led to a 
UDI on 4 May 1990, formally proclaimed as a «Declaration of Independence Restoration». 
At the same time, it was decided to make the Constitution of 1922 effective, as it had been 
abolished with the Soviet invasion in 1940. On 3 March 1991, a public consultation took 
place. It had the nature of a referendum in order not to contravene the Soviet legality, but to 
legitimate it at the same time. The formulation of the question was: «Are you for the 
democratic and independent constitution of the State of the Republic of Latvia?». While 
there was a minimum turnout set on 50%, it reached 80%. The supporters of the «yes» were 
73.7% (64.47% of the electoral census) and the supporters of the «no», 24.7%. The new 
Constitution was passed on 15 February 1992, almost a year after the referendum, and 
became effective on 7 November, a year and five months after the UDI.  
 
In Ukraine, within the framework of the reforms started in 1985 by President 
Mikhail Gorbachov in the USSR, communists and nationalists Ukrainians started the 
Popular Movement for Perestroika in Ukraine (RUKH), which claimed a wider political 
and economic autonomy. In the legislative election of March 1990, the Supreme Soviet 
(Parliament) unilaterally proclaimed the independence of the Republic and, on 24 August 
1991, the Act or Law of Independence was passed, for which a referendum of ratification 
was called, held on 11 December 1992. In this referendum, the question was «Are you for 
the Act of proclamation of Independence of Ukraine?». The turnout was 84.18% and the 
supporters of the «yes» reached 90.2%
38
. At the same ceremony, Leonid Kravchuk, ex-first 
secretary of the KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine) was elected president. At dawn on 28 
June 1996, the Parliament adopted a Constitution which, according to the interpretation of 
the Constitutional Court, became effective at the same time as the result of the 
parliamentary election was made public (five years and eleven months after the UDI). 
Previously, on 8 June 1995, President Leonid Kuchman and spokesman Oleksandr Moroz, 
in the name of the Parliament, had subscribed a provisional Constitutional Agreement 
whose validity was extended until the moment of the passing of the Constitution. Law num. 
254/96-BP ratified the Constitution, leaving the above-mentioned provisional 







                                                          
38
 Paradoxically, the process was interrupted when, in March 1991, a referendum was held exclusively 
regarding the preservation of the unit of the Republic within the USSR. It was won by the supporters of the 
«yes» (70.2%, with a turnout of 86.5%) who widely defeated the independence supporters. The difference in 
the results of the two referendums is explained with the loss of the Soviet supremacy, as a result of the 
conspiracy carried out by members of the CPSU and the KGB, which contributed to the fall of president 
Gorbachov.  
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The independence of Kosovo, province of Serbia under international administration 
since 1999, was unilaterally declared by its Assembly on 17 February 2008
39
, on the basis 
of a report and a Program made by the Special envoy of the United Nations, Matti 
Ahtisaari. At the same time as the parliamentary UDI, the same Assembly passed a 
Constitution which replaced the constitutional framework based on the Resolution 1244 of 
the Security Council of the United Nations, which the administration of the UN had 
regulated. However, it did not become effective until 15 June of the same year
40
. The 
Declaration was supported by the United States and a majority of the member States of the 
European Union, which did not assume a common position at the Security Council of the 
UN. Russia and China opposed the proposal. It was in July 2010 when, as it has been 
repeatedly said, the ICJ issued the Advisory Opinion stating that the UDI neither violated 
general International law nor resolution 1244 of the Security Council.  
 
Regarding the internal institutionalization process of the new Republic and given 
the particular concurrent circumstances, the Civil International Office responsible for the 
supervision of the process was created. On 10 September 2012, the International Steering 
Group for Kosovo (ISG) considered that its duty in the country had officially concluded, 
which was interpreted by the Pristina Parliament as the first concluding manifestation of 
full sovereignty. Progressively, 106 out of the 193 countries of the United Nations 
recognized the independence of Kosovo. Amongst them, there were 23 out of the 28 States 
of the European Union
41
, 22 out of 27 NATO members and 7 of the 8 members of the G-8, 
remarkably, the USA
42
. In addition, the Republic of China (Taiwan) has offered its 
recognition, although Kosovo has not accepted it. Nevertheless, several countries (amongst 
them Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan Belarus, Spain, Slovakia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Moldavia, Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Vietnam and Cyprus) keep their 
rejection to the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, and their respect to the territorial 
integrity of Serbia. On their behalf, Brazil, Chile, Jordan, Mexico, Thailand and Uruguay 
are waiting for a pronouncement by the Security Council of the United Nations to adopt a 
final decision.   
                                                          
39
 The ballot succeeded with the vote of 109 representatives out of 120, because Serbian representatives 
abandoned the session. 
40
 Throughout 2006 internal tensions in the governing party led to the resignation of Prime Minister Kosumi 
in March, his replacement by Agim Çeku and, finally, to the defeat of the Democratic League of Kosovo by 
the Democratic Party in the election of November 2007. The leader of this party, Hashim Thaçi, became 
prime minister of a coalition government with the League and it was under his management that the UDI was 
passed.  
41
 The Resolution of the European Parliament, from March 29, 2012 on the process of integration of Kosovo 
in the European Union (2011/2885 (*RSP) (2013/C 257 I/05) acknowledges the satisfactory support and the 
recognition of Kosovo by many countries, and it also regrets the diplomatic pressure exercised by Serbia.  
42
 It must be highlighted that the United States had military-strategic interests on the area, where they set 
Camp Bondsteel, the second biggest North-American base in the world.  
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Concerning the membership to international organizations, it must be noted that the 
Republic of Kosovo has never formalized an application of membership to the United 
Nations, due to the announced veto from Russia at the Security Council. In the case of the 
EU, although it does not formally recognize new states, unanimity would be necessary 
regardless of the position of its members. This unanimity does not exist nowadays, in spite 
of the political recognition reached at the European Parliament
43
. The International 
Monetary Fund started the process of integration of Kosovo as a permanent member in June 
2008, and on 5 May 2009, it was accepted with 96 favorable votes. Later on, this fostered 
its application of entry to the World Bank, which was passed on 4 June 2009 and was made 
official on 29 June, obtaining, therefore, its first adhesion to a specialized body of the 
United Nations.  
 
Kosovo is living a strong process of integration into Europe from the negotiation of 
an Agreement of Stability and Association with the EU initiated by its Council on 16 
October 2013. Therefore, it is overcoming the initial refusal of some of the member states 
to its future integration. It is a negotiation that is coming to a final point in 2014
44
, and 
which has a direct bond to the application of the case of Serbia, to follow the steps of 
Croatia and become a new member state of the EU.  
 
 
IV.3. Slovenia and Macedonia 
 
On 23 December 1990 a referendum on the independence of Slovenia took place. In 
this referendum, both the government and the opposition forces unanimously supported the 
secession. The Parliament set a minimum turnout of 51% and the question was «[S]hould 
the Slovenia Republic become a sovereign and independent State?». The supporters of the 
«yes» reached 88.6% of votes and those for the «no» reached 4%. The Independence was 
formally proclaimed on 25 June 1991 at the same time as the one in Croatia, and on 5 
October of the same year, the Parliament approved the end of its official commitment with 
Yugoslavia. From that moment on, Slovenia set its own currency, the Tolar, its own 
national institutions and applied several measures to make its sovereignty stronger. The 
National Assembly adopted the Constitutional text on 23 December 1991, and it became 
effective on the same day. In January 1992, the EEC recognized Slovenia and Croatia as 
independent States, although there still was a civil war in Croatia. The homogeneity of its 
population made its secession one of the less bloody ones in the breakdown process in ex-
                                                          
43
 The resolution of the European Parliament from January 16, 2014, accepts, among other issues, to «Ask the 
Council to adopt the necessary decisions to allow Kosovo to be part of the programs of the EU as soon as 
possible». http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0040+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [Visited: 25th November 2014]. 
44
 On April 1st, 2014, there was a Meeting between the European Commissioner, Stefan Füle, and the 
government of Kosovo, to analyze the final stage of the annexation process to the EU. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-91_en.htm   [Visited 25
th
 of November 2014]. 
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Yugoslavia, and its international recognition was one of the clearest, because the country 
dominated its borders, kept its own army and issued its national currency.  
 
In Macedonia, on 16 April 1991, the Parliament passed an amendment to the 
Constitution in which the word «Socialist» was removed from the official name of the 
State. On 7 June, the new name, Republic of Macedonia, was officially accepted. After the 
beginning of the breakdown process in Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia proclaimed 
their independence, after calling a popular consultation on 8 September of that year. The 
question was: «Are you for an independent Macedonia, with the right to enter in a future 
union of the sovereign countries of Yugoslavia?». With a turnout of 72%, the supporters of 
the «yes» were 95.1% and the ones for the «no» 4.8%. There were no minimum turnout 
requirements to validate the agreements. The Constitution was passed and became effective 
two months later, on 17 November 1991. Afterwards, a second referendum was held, this 
time for ratification, on 12 January 1992. This time, the Albanian minority voted for the 
creation of their own State. In the next month, the Social Democrat Branko Crvenkovski 
was elected Prime Minister and got the recognition of Macedonia by Russia, Albania, 
Bulgaria and Turkey. In April 1993, the country obtained its recognition as a member of the 
United Nations under the provisional name of «Ex-Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia». 
 
 
IV.4. Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The case of Montenegro presents some remarkable singularities, such as the fact 
that in this republic there was a referendum on independence under constitutional coverage. 
Indeed, the Serbia and Montenegro Union Constitution of 2003, was one of the few 
constitutional texts of a federal-confederate nature that explicitly contained a clause on 
secession. It also contemplated political, institutional, economic and social structures 
practically divided from Serbia.  
 
But before this, a first referendum (1992) was held, in which those for remaining 
within the Yugoslavian Federation obtained 95.96% of the votes. The magnitude of this 
result is explained by the fact that Muslims, Albanians, and Catholic minorities boycotted 
the consultation, in the same way as the supporters of independence did. All these sectors 
alleged that the referendum had been organized under non-democratic conditions. As soon 
as the pro-independence forces, led by Milo Dukanovic, came to power (with a narrow 
margin of votes, in 1996) the relationships between the two confederated republics got 
worse. The leadership of Montenegro asked for the celebration of a referendum for 
independence and decided to set an economic policy aside from Serbia. Among other 
measures, this policy contemplated the establishment of the German Mark as official 
currency (which would be replaced by the Euro later on, despite of them not being part of 
the Eurozone). Nevertheless, both of them reached a new cooperation agreement in 2012, 
according to which the Yugoslavian Federation allowed the so-called Federation of Serbia 
and Montenegro, which became constitutionalized, as said before, in 2003, contemplating 
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the possibility of secession and postponing the celebration of a referendum with this 
purpose to 30 April 2006 (which was postponed once again to May 21).  
 
However, Europe did not support this independence process at first. What most 
concerned the international community, especially the European diplomacy, led by Javier 
Solana, was that the case of Montenegro could open, once again, a door to solve other 
conflicts in European regions (i.e. the Srpska Republic, Abkhazia or Nagorno-Karabaj). It 
must be taken into account that even Transnítria and South Ossetia, called for referendums 
to be held on 17 September and 12 November 2006, respectively. Finally, however, the EU 
and the NATO accepted the referendum, and they even fixed the regulations and sent 
international observers to the process: a minimum turnout of 50% and favorable result of 
55%, in addition to other conditions like respect to fundamental rights (especially freedom 
of speech and demonstration), neutrality in the campaign by the authorities and the media, 
and clarity in the question. These requirements were outlined by the Venice Commission, 
which issued a dictum requested by the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council, 
which was assumed by the Ministry Council and the High Representative of Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union
45
. The requirements of the referendum 
were negotiated with the Montenegrin political representatives and were reflected on the 
Montenegrin Law on the referendum of the State, from 1 March 2006. From here, the 
referendum of 21
 
May 2006 was organized. The consultation was held on 21 May 2006, 
with a turnout of 86.5% and a question that said: «Do you want the Republic of 
Montenegro to be an independent State with full legal and international personality?». The 
«yes» option obtained 55.5% of the votes, five tenths more than what had been stipulated as 
the minimum percentage, and the «no» obtained 44.5%. The parliamentary UDI was 
delayed until 17 February 2008. The new Constitution was adopted on 19 October 2007 
and replaced the previous one, from 1992, when the country was part of the Yugoslavian 
federation.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina held a referendum on 28 and 29 February 1992. It had a 
binding nature and participation and results were established on 50% to be valid. The 
question was: «Are you for a sovereign, indivisible and independent Bosnia and 
Herzegovina?». The opposition to the referendum by the main Serbian party went beyond 
the threat of a violent answer and it led to war. However, the Washington Agreement, 
signed on 18 March 1994 led to the creation of a Constitutive Assembly (Ustavotvorna 
skupstina/Ustavotvorbeni Sabor), which was kept until 1996. On 21 November 1995, this 
Assembly adopted the text of a Constitution, enacted on 14 December, which reproduced 
                                                          
45
 The Venice Commission, advisory body of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council, paid 
attention to the subject of the majority required to consider the referendum valid and issued a dictum under 
the petition of the Parliamentary Assembly and the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy of the European Union. One of the set requirements was to establish the majority on a 55% of the 
issued votes for independence as a necessary result of the referendum, as well as a turnout of more than 50% 
of the electoral census. <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD (2005) 034.aspx> [visited 
on February 1st, 2014]. 
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the fourth annex of the Dayton Peace Agreement, from 21 November 1995. It was formally 
signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 and the war ceased with it. For this reason, The 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina has the nature of an International Treaty.  
 
 
V. THE VIABILITY OF A UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE SPANISH 
CONTEXT 
 
As we know, a Unilateral Declaration of Independence does not conform to the 
regulation of the Spanish constitutional orders, because it would suppose de facto that the 
Catalan people, through their representatives, would have affirmed themselves as sovereign 
subjects
46
. However, the fact that the Spanish government is denying this territory the 
possibility to negotiate the execution of any type of consultation to decide their future 
political status, based on democratic principles, even as a step prior to promoting a reform 
of the constitutional order, could legitimize a Declaration of this type. This question was 
raised, as we have already examined, in the Ruling of the Court of International Justice at 
the Hague, regarding the case of Kosovo, in which the Kosovar Assembly was not 
operating as a self-governing institution of the pre-existing administration and within its 
limits, on the contrary, it was operating outside it, by virtue of the faculties conferred upon 
it by the democratic representation of popular will. According to the ICJ the declaration of 
independence did not intend to produce its effects within the already existing legal order, 
quite the opposite, it intended to create a new legality. 
 
Therefore, in the light of this verdict as well as of the practices analysed in previous 
sections, a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Catalonia can occur in two possible 
scenarios: In the first one, although the UDI entailed a breaking of the internal order of the 
Spanish State, the Catalan Institutions could decide to prepare the structures of a future 
State gradually, to negotiate the distribution of actives and passives with the Spanish 
Government and the terms of the joining the EU during a sensible period of 18 months. The 
second possible scenario is the one of non-cooperation or the one of a systematic blocking 
by the Spanish State.  This would impugn any legal or political action inherent to the 
process. In this case, it does not seem reasonable to postpone the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence to the following months and the search of arbitration by the EU or another 
international body would be a priority.  
 
                                                          
46
Another thing is that, as has already been discussed, it is difficult to dispute the fact that the Catalan 
community is already a people, in the normally accepted sense of the term, and consequently, in view of some 
of the precedents accepted by the international community, a political subject with the right to decide their 
own political future. Catalonia boasts a history that dates back thousands of years, its own language, its own 
civil law, a different social and economic structure, autonomous political institutions, and a will that over the 
centuries has expressed the desire to maintain its own identity, that is backed by its national condition that is 
referred to, even if indirectly, in the very preamble of the current Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. 
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In that situation, the UDI would have the potentiality to implicate the institutions of 
the Union and, generally speaking, the international community. In this blocking scenario, 
according to the Advisory Council for the National Transition of the Catalan Government 
(ACNT)
47
 two possibilities would emerge: The first one, a UDI after an election of a 
plebiscitary nature called to this effect, with the aim to implement its results. It would 
necessarily have the nature of an autonomic election, but with the electoral commitment of 
proclaiming a UDI if the majority of the pro-independence forces was achieved. The 
second one would be to proclaim the UDI before an election, notwithstanding that this 
could be ratified afterwards by a referendum or a popular consultation. In the first case, the 
plebiscitary election could be considered as politically legitimated if it was a consequence 
of the prevention of the Spanish Government, using all kinds of instruments to celebrate a 
consultation or a popular referendum, or if it was the result of having exhibited a position 
of total blocking when trying to implement the results of this legally held consultations.  
 
In fact, taking into account the typology of the above-mentioned precedents, this 
would be a similar case, and successfully tested, taking the case of the Baltic Republics and 
Ukraine as a model, where an election resulted in a Declaration of Independence 
proclaimed by a Parliament after having obtained majorities, and further ratifying the 
results in a referendum. In all these cases, once international recognition was achieved, the 
constituent process started and a Constitution was adopted a year later (with the singularity 
of Ukraine, where an Agreement of Constitutional nature, which remained legal during all 
the constituent process, was provisionally adopted together with the UDI special law). In 
the case of Kosovo, even though it was a Parliamentarian UDI, it was a territory under 
international guardianship. Besides, the Assembly passed a Constitution, which replaced 
the constitutional framework based on Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of the 
United Nations. The new Constitution was based on the Plan designed by the Special 
Envoy of the United Nations, Matti Ahtisaari, although its coming into effects was 
postponed a few months.  
 
On the contrary, the cases which followed the procedure of the referendum after a 
UDI cannot be compared to the Catalan case. In Slovenia, this sequence was possible 
thanks to a unanimous agreement between all the political pro-independence forces and it 
got a wide international recognition that led to a constituent process. In Macedonia, the 
summons to a referendum was followed by a subsequent intervention of the United Nations 
to avoid conflicts between ethnic groups and, for this reason, it did not obtain international 
recognition until of an election.   
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 Report n. 4 of the ACNT: Internationalization of the consultation and the process of self-determination in 
Catalonia. See http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/docs/2013/12/20/15/24/cdf4c2aa-3b6c-4bf8-a9cc-
e58ea3c357a3.pdf [visited on April 3, 2014]. 
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Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea and South Sudan present a common 
singularity: the intervention of an international body which protected and disciplined the 
process ab initio. In the first case, the referendum counted on constitutional coverage, 
although it was rejected by a great part of the international community, and it was finally 
carried out according to what was set by the European Council and the EU (contemplated 
in a singular law which led to the consultation on May 21, 2006). In Bosnia, the previous 
referendum led to an intervention of the international community, especially the United 
States, to bring peace to this territory and Serbia. It was the Washington Accords from 1994 
which led to the creation of a Constituent Assembly. And it was this Assembly the one 
which adopted a constitutional text the following year, according to what was contemplated 
in an annex of the Peace Agreement of Dayton. In Eritrea, conversations fostered by the 
USA led to the celebration of a referendum, and only after an almost unanimous vote for 
independence, it was proclaimed afterwards, and was recognized by the United Nations, the 
OAU and the Arab League. The constitution was not passed by the Parliament until 23 May 
1997. In South Sudan, after a Peace Agreement, a constitution which ended the Second 
Sudanese Civil War was enacted and, after a referendum on independence, a Constitution 
was adopted and the independence was officially declared afterwards.  
 
After having seen all these precedents, the Catalan process could be settled using 
two instruments: the first instrument could be the proposal of a resolution presented by all 
the pro-UDI parliamentary groups, although it would not have legal effects, as it is passed 
on the basis of the exercise of the function of the parliamentary momentum;  the second 
instrument could be a proposal or a bill, presented by all the pro-UDI parliamentary groups, 
with more formal and normative relevance, passed by simple majority in both of the cases. 
Regarding its content, there are several possibilities: either a short text which only 
contemplates the will to build up Catalonia as an Independent State, considering that it 
must be attached to parliamentary decisions related to the legal framework of the transition, 
as suggested by the ACNT; or a declaration that includes the declaration itself, that is, the 
claim to exercise sovereignty and to be considered as a successor of the Spanish State, plus 
a solemn declaration of pro-European will and for peace, democracy and human rights, 
with a focus on some International Law instruments of the European Union such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the Framework Agreement for the protection of Ethnic and National 
Minorities of the European Council, the Final Act of Helsinki on agreements of nuclear 
non-proliferation, etc. The most representative local and civil society entities could 
externally join this political and legislative act.  
 
The above-mentioned declaration of succession to the Spanish State has two 
dimensions: an external one, consisting in the guarantee of its automatic reception in the 
Catalan legal order and the full observance of those treaties which are not constitutive of 
international organizations, and another one, of an internal nature, which would have the 
aim of guaranteeing the continuity of the provisions of the legal Spanish system in the 
Catalan State, while they are not modified according to the normal legislative procedure.  
THE RIGHT TO SECESSION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 4 (June 2015) pp. 111-137    ISSN: 2340-9592 
136 
 
The inherent complexity of the new level that the creation of a new state implies is 
due to the need of the new state to endow itself of a legal system, which takes time and 
means. Thus, until the beginning of the constitutional process itself, and the passing of the 
Constitution of the Catalan State, most of the system should be formed by previously 
existing regulations, both Catalan and Spanish, such as the 2006 Statute of Autonomy. This 
would force the adoption of a law which provisionally regulates this transfer situation and 
guarantees the regular and stable functioning of the State of Right, as well as providing the 
solution to possible conflicts with administration or legality. It must not be forgotten that 
the transition to democracy in Spain after the death of the dictator Francisco Franco was 
made according to the current legality. Thus, a new reform of the Fundamental Laws (the 
seventh one, in particular) was dictated, which allowed the call for a legislative election on 
15 June 1977. As a consequence, a constitution was written, which derogated the 
Fundamental Laws enacted by Franco.  
 
Apart from contemplating the interpretative and of-application rules which 
guarantee the principle of plenitude and coherence and avoid a legal vacuum, this transitory 
regulation should also take into account the decision-taking mechanisms, the bodies 
responsible for them and the regime of guarantees and resources in administrative seats. At 
the same time, it should also regulate the functioning of the legal Catalan institutions in 
order to consider an appropriate and permanent system of guarantees of the international 
system. Needless to say, this regulation should have a given validity to avoid the maximum 
legal insecurity. So, after the expiration of the above-mentioned deadline, in a second stage, 
it should be necessary to analyze the subjects and the physical or legal institutions which, 
for strategic or emergency reasons, require the adoption of ad hoc regulations from 
whichever rank.  
 
Any of the above-mentioned instruments that would be used in a secession process 
of Catalonia from the Spanish State would fully respond to the democratic principle
48
 
which, together with the European Citizenship principle, supports the sense and functioning 
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